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Managing Charter Equality Rights: The Supreme Court of Canada’s
Disposition of Leave to Appeal Applications in Section 15 Cases, 1989‐
2010
Bruce Ryder* and Taufiq Hashmani**
When scholars study the work of the Supreme Court of Canada, we typically focus our attention
on the Court’s written opinions. In this volume of papers drawn from Osgoode Hall Law
School’s annual Constitutional Cases conference, as in legal writing and analysis more generally,
scholars carefully parse the Court’s rulings – the words with which the justices have chosen to
speak. We pay less attention to what the Court has chosen not to say. But the Court’s silences
may speak more loudly than its words. The Court has the power to control the cases it will hear
through the process of deciding whether to grant leave to appeal. Through the leave process,
the Court decides when it will speak and when it will remain silent. Excavating how the Court
has gone about exercising the power to choose which issues to address strikes us as an
important task of scholarship.
The existing scholarship on the leave to appeal process tends to focus on the general approach
taken by the Court, as well as general trends in the number of leave applications and their
disposition by the Court.1 Less study has been undertaken of the Court’s handling of leave
applications in specific areas of the law. This understudied part of the Court’s work can provide
revealing information about the issues the Court does and does not want to address.
This paper seeks to add to our understanding of the Court’s work by conducting a close
examination of how it has disposed of leave applications in cases involving alleged violations of
the equality rights in s.15 of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms. We were drawn to this topic in
part because the Court’s relative silence on Charter equality rights in recent years has been
more notable than what it has said in its rulings on s.15. For example, in its 2009 rulings that are
the focus of this volume, the Court summarily dismissed s.15 claims in three rulings
preoccupied with other legal issues.2 In each case, equality rights were a sideshow to the main
event.

*

Associate Professor and Assistant Dean First Year, Osgoode Hall Law School, York University

**

Class of 2012, Osgoode Hall Law School, York University.

1

See Brian A. Crane and Henry S. Brown, “Leave to Appeal Applications: The 1998‐89 Term” (1990) 2 S.C.L.R. 483 (and subsequent reports
published annually in the Supreme Court Law Review); Henry S. Brown, Supreme Court of Canada Practice 2010 (Scarborough, ON: Carswell,
2009); Roy B. Flemming, Tournament of Appeals: Granting Judicial Review in Canada (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2004); Donald R. Songer, The
Transformation of the Supreme Court of Canada: An Empirical Examination (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2008), chapter 3, “Setting the
Agenda”; Ian Greene et al, Final Appeal: Decision‐Making in Canadian Courts of Appeal (Toronto: Lorimer, 1998) at 107‐112; Ian Bushnell,
“Leave to Appeal Applications to the Supreme Court of Canada”, (1982) 3 S.C.L.R. 479; Bertha Wilson, “Leave to Appeal to the Supreme Court of
Canada” (1983) 4 Adv. Q. 1; Robert G. Richards, “Motions for Leave to Appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada” (1979‐1981) 2 Adv. Q. 460.
2

A.C. v. Manitoba (Director of Child and Family Services), [2009] 2 S.C.R. 181 at paras. 109‐11 per Abella J., paras. 150‐2 per McLachlin C.J.,
paras. 226‐31 per Binnie J.; Alberta v. Hutterian Brethren of Wilson Colony, [2009] 2 S.C.R. 567 at paras. 105‐8 per McLachlin C.J.; Ermineskin
Indian Band and Nation v. Canada, [2009] 1 S.C.R. at paras. 185‐202, per Rothstein J.
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We were also drawn to this topic because of our awareness, from following equality rights
jurisprudence and scholarship3 closely, that s.15 claims are at the moment a rapidly diminishing
feature of the Canadian legal landscape,4 and that the courts are significantly more likely to
dismiss s.15 claims than they were in the past.5 Not so long ago, in 1997, the Supreme Court
declared that “[t]he rights enshrined in s. 15(1) of the Charter are fundamental to Canada. They
reflect the fondest dreams, the highest hopes and finest aspirations of Canadian society.”6
Since then, Charter equality rights seem to inhabit a less exalted place in the Canadian legal
imagination. What has happened to the dreams, hopes and aspirations enshrined in s.15? To
what extent have they been realized? To what extent and in what ways are litigants continuing
to pursue the transformational promise of s.15?
While these broader questions form a backdrop to our ongoing investigations, we cannot begin
to answer them in this paper. Our modest aim here is to shed some light on the Supreme Court
of Canada’s role in guiding the development of Charter equality rights jurisprudence by focusing
on its decision‐making record in leave to appeal applications in s.15 cases. To what extent has
the Court’s interest in hearing s.15 appeals shifted over time? What Charter equality rights
issues has the Court chosen to address or not to address?
We will begin by briefly describing the leave to appeal process. We will then describe the
dataset of s.15 leave cases we have assembled, and the trends in s.15 grant rates it reveals over
the course of the past two decades. We will compare the decline in the rate at which the Court
grants leave to appeal in s.15 cases with the grant rate in Charter cases generally, and will
speculate about why the grant rate in s.15 cases has declined more sharply in the past decade
than it has for Charter cases as a whole. We then turn to an examination of whether the grant
rate in s.15 cases, and the rate at which appeals are allowed when the Court does grant leave,
differ depending on whether the s.15 claim was found to be established at the Court of Appeal.
In both regards, our data reveal that the Court’s record leans heavily in favour of governments
in s.15 cases. We conclude that the Supreme Court has played a significant role, through its
management of the appeal process, in directing a restricted scope for Charter equality rights.

3

Two excellent collections of essays that address the contemporary challenges facing Canadian equality rights jurisprudence are Fay Faraday,
Margaret Denike and M. Kate Stephenson eds., Making Equality Rights Real: Securing Substantive Equality Under the Charter (Toronto: Irwin
Law, 2006) and Sheila McIntyre and Sanda Rodgers eds., Diminishing Returns: Inequality and the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms
(Markham, ON: LexisNexis Butterworths, 2006) (the same essays also appear in (2006) 33 S.C.L.R. (2d) 1‐412).

4

From 1989 to 2009, the number of reported judicial rulings disposing of claims alleging violations of s.15 of the Charter has hovered around an
annual average of 40. In the first half of 2010, we have found only 7 reported court rulings disposing of s.15 claims.

5

Our data on all reported judicial rulings in s.15 claims since 1989 reveals that the rate at which courts find s.15 claims to be established has
dropped by close to 50% in the 2004‐2009 period compared to the previous 15 years.
6

Vriend v. Alberta, [1998] 1 S.C.R. 493 at para. 67.
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I. THE LEAVE TO APPEAL PROCESS
Apart from a significant minority of criminal appeals that reach the Supreme Court as of right,
and a small number of reference questions directed to the Court by government, the Court
exercises discretionary control over its docket through the power to grant or dismiss
applications for leave to appeal. First enacted in 1975, s.40(1) of the Supreme Court Act7
empowers the Court to grant leave to appeal to a case when it
…is of the opinion that any question involved therein is, by reason of its public
importance or the importance of any issue of law or any issue of mixed law and
fact involved in that question, one that ought to be decided by the Supreme
Court or is, for any other reason, of such a nature or significance as to warrant
decision by it...
As Songer has noted, “the statute does not define ‘public importance’ and the court has not
published any clarifying guidelines”.8 Based on interviews with and articles published by the
justices, and the testimony of former clerks, we know that the Court’s exercise of discretion on
leave applications is driven primarily by the need to develop or clarify the law on issues of
national importance. Leave is more likely to be granted when issues have a national scope, as is
the case with the interpretation of federal statutes and the constitution, particularly if there is a
new point of law or a need to resolve conflicting rulings from appellate courts. Because of the
limited number of appeals the Court can hear, correcting what the Court perceives to be
mistakes in the lower courts is a secondary consideration.9
Several kinds of silence characterize the leave process. First, the decision‐making process on
leave applications itself is shrouded in silence. For reasons of economy dictated by the sheer
volume of leave applications (over 500 annually in recent years), the Court issues no reasons
when it decides whether to grant or dismiss applications for leave to appeal. As a result, the
leave process is characterized by a lack of transparency and accountability. Apart from the
statutory criterion of “public importance”, a formulation similar in its breadth and vagueness to
ones the Court has condemned in other contexts as “standardless”,10 the Court controls its
docket according to undisclosed criteria.
Second, when the Court dismisses applications for leave to appeal, it chooses to remain silent
on the issues at stake. It chooses not to comment on the dispute between the parties. It
chooses not to use cases denied leave to contribute to the development or clarification of the
law. In addition, denials of leave close off the final avenue of appeal, thereby confirming the
precedential value of the appeal court rulings from which leave to appeal was sought. The
7

R.S.C. 1985, c.S‐26.

8

Songer, supra note 3 at 46.

9

For an overview of the literature, see Songer, id., at 46‐53.

10

See, e.g., R. v. Morales, [1992] 3 S.C.R. 711 (holding that the “public interest” is too vague and imprecise a standard to structure judicial
discretion in bail hearings in a meaningful way).
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power to deny leave to appeal is thus an important part of the Court’s role in supervising the
development of Canadian law. As Flemming concluded in his recent book investigating the
leave to appeal process,
The administrative justification for this authority should not obscure the power
that comes from the exercise of this discretion. Agenda‐setting authority in a
tournament of appeals constructed by the justices in which they are the key
players augments and bolsters their impact on public policies and on the day‐to‐
day concerns of government officials, Parliament, and Canadian citizens.11

II. DATASET OF SECTION 15 LEAVE CASES
Using Quicklaw, CanLii and the Supreme Court’s case information database,12 we compiled a
dataset consisting of all of the Court’s decisions on leave to appeal applications in s.15 cases
since September 1, 1989.13 We included a case in our dataset if it met the following criteria:
• the lower courts addressed a claim alleging a violation of s.15 of the Canadian Charter of
Rights and Freedoms, finding it to be established or not established;14
• a party sought leave to appeal to the Court on the s.15 violation issue; and
• the Court granted or dismissed the application for leave to appeal after September 1, 1989.
When we refer to “s.15 leave cases” or “s.15 leave applications”, we are referring to cases that
meet these three criteria.
We adopted these three criteria of inclusion to meet our objective of measuring patterns of
Supreme Court decision‐making over time on applications for leave to appeal from lower court
rulings dealing with alleged violations of s.15 of the Charter. We did not include cases where
s.15 is enlisted solely as an aid to the interpretation of a statute or other legal rule. We did not
include cases that involved arguments based on “equality values” (as opposed to equality
rights). We did not include cases involving alleged violations of non‐constitutional equality
11

Flemming, supra note 3 at 106.

12

We conducted searches on Quicklaw’s “Supreme Court of Canada Rulings on Applications for Leave to Appeal” database and on CanLii’s
“Supreme Court of Canada – Applications for Leave” database. We also used searches on Quicklaw and CanLii to compile a list of all appellate
rulings on s.15 claims, and then searched the case information database on the Court’s website using the names of the parties. After compiling
cases from these three sources, we are confident that our dataset represents a comprehensive record of the Court’s decision‐making on s.15
leave applications (that otherwise meet our criteria of inclusion) since September 1, 1989.
13

We used the Court’s 1989‐1990 Term as our starting point because judicial interpretation of Charter equality rights was particularly chaotic
prior to the Court’s first s.15 ruling in Andrews v. Law Society of British Columbia, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 143, released on February 2, 1989. To track
patterns of decision‐making in s.15 leave applications over time, we decided to exclude the leave record in the doctrinally unstructured earliest
days of judicial interpretation of s.15.
14

We characterize s.15 claims as “established” at the Court of Appeal if the court found a violation of s.15 that was not demonstrably justified
as a reasonable limit pursuant to s.1. We characterize s.15 claims as “not established” at the Court of Appeal if the court did not find a violation
of s.15 or if the court found a violation of s.15 that was demonstrably justified as a reasonable limit pursuant to s.1.
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rights. Moreover, in an effort to focus our dataset on “genuine” s.15 appeals, if an applicant
alleged a violation of s.15 for the first time as part of the leave to appeal application,15 we
excluded the case from our dataset.16 We made the same decision if a s.15 violation was
alleged in the lower courts, but the courts did not address it. If we had included these cases in
our dataset, the grant rate in “genuine” s.15 appeals would have been distorted.17
Using our criteria of inclusion, we generated a dataset consisting of 177 s.15 leave cases from
1989 to 2010. For each of these cases, we recorded the following information:
• whether the s.15 claim was established or not established at the Court of Appeal;
• whether the application for leave to appeal to the SCC was granted or dismissed;
• the date of the SCC decision on the leave application; and
• whether the SCC allowed or dismissed the appeal on the s.15 issue.18
The full list of cases, and a summary of these features of each case, appears in Appendix B
below.

III. TRENDS IN DECISION‐MAKING IN SECTION 15 LEAVE CASES
The annual grant rate in s.15 leave applications is reproduced in Appendix A, below. While the
percentage of s.15 cases granted leave fluctuates from year to year because of the small
number of cases, a more discernible pattern emerges if the grant rate in s.15 cases is
aggregated over five year periods. From 1989‐1994, the grant rate in s.15 cases was 38.5% and
from 1994‐1999, it was 47.1%. The grant rate declined dramatically to 24.1% from 1999‐2004,
and declined further, to 22.0%, from 2004‐2009. These numbers are illustrated in Chart 1
below.

15

This happens fairly regularly as applicants for leave strive to convince the Court that their appeals raise issues of public importance. Some
leave applicants take a “kitchen‐sink” approach, thinking, mistakenly, that adding a constitutional issue or two will add gravitas to their leave
applications.

16

Thus, for example, while leave was granted to argue s.15 in Charkaoui v. Canada, [2007] 1 S.C.R. 350, since none of the proceedings below
(involving the claimants Almrei, Charkaoui and Harkat) considered s.15, the case is not included in our dataset.

17

When a claimant seeks leave to appeal to argue a s.15 violation, it is almost always denied if the s.15 violation has not been considered in the
lower courts. Examples of exceptions to the general practice include Charkaoui, id., and R. v. Malmo‐Levine; R. v. Caine, [2003] 3 S.C.R. 571 (in
any case, in both cases the Court ended up devoting little attention to the s.15 arguments).

18

We did not record whether the Court allowed or dismissed the appeal on other grounds; we focused exclusively on the result of the appeal
on the question of whether a violation of s.15 was established.
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If one compares the numbers cumulatively by decade, from 1989‐1999, the Court granted leave
in 31 of 73, or 42.5%, of s.15 cases; from 1999‐2009, the Court granted leave in 22 of 95, or
23.2%, of s.15 cases. If one includes the partial data (see Appendices A and B, below) available
at the time of writing from the first eleven months of the 2009‐2010 Term (1 in 9 cases granted
leave), the cumulative grant rate in s.15 cases since 1999 has dipped to 22.1%.
In sum, applicants for leave in section 15 cases in the late 1990s had a close to even chance of
being granted leave. Now, the odds of s.15 applicants being granted leave are less than one in
four and the trend towards increasingly longer odds is continuing. How can we explain the
decline of over 20% in the grant rate for s.15 leave applications since the 1990s?
Part of the explanation lies in the fact that the Court’s grant rate in all leave applications has
declined steadily in recent decades as the number of leave applications has increased. Between
1970 and 1990, the Court granted leave to 25‐35% of leave applications.19 In the 1990s, the
grant rate declined from 22% at the beginning of the decade to 13% by its conclusion.20 The
average grant rate in all leave applications through the 1990s was 15%.21 The overall grant rate

19

Flemming, supra note 3, at 30.

20

Id. at 12.

21

Id.
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has slipped even lower in recent years: from 2004‐09 it was 11.8%.22 In sum, over the period
covered by our study, the Court has faced increasing pressures on its docket that have forced it
to be more selective in granting leave to appeal. The grant rate in s.15 cases is significantly
higher than the grant rate in leave applications as a whole. However, most of the drop in the
Court’s overall grant rate took place in the 1990s; since then it has declined relatively slowly.
On the other hand, with s.15 cases, the grant rate was at its highest in the late 1990s. The sharp
decline in s.15 grant rates has occurred in the past decade, whereas most of the decline in the
Court’s overall leave granting rate took place earlier, in the 1990s.
It is also helpful to consider our data on declining s.15 grant rates in relation to changes over
time in the Court’s grant rate in Charter cases as a whole. Since 1990, Brian A. Crane, Henry S.
Brown and their co‐authors have published annual data in the Supreme Court Law Review on
grant rates in various categories of cases, including criminal and non‐criminal Charter cases.23
Chart 2 below aggregates their data over five‐year periods to depict the decline in the grant
rate in all Charter cases (both criminal and non‐criminal) since 1989.

Source: Compiled from data in Brian A. Crane and Henry S. Brown et al, annual reports on
applications for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada, Supreme Court Law Review,
1990 to 2009.
22

This number is an aggregate of the data on leave applications from 2004‐09 drawn from the annual reports published by Henry S. Brown and
his co‐authors. See Henry S. Brown and Marion Van de Wetering, “Annual Report on Applications for Leave to Appeal to the Supreme Court of
Canada: The 2008‐09 Term”, (2009) 48 S.C.L.R. (2d) 323 (67 of 517, or 13%, of applications granted); Henry S. Brown and Joshua A. Krane,
“Annual Report on Applications for Leave to Appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada: The 2007‐08 Term”, (2008) 43 S.C.L.R. (2d) 343 (53 of 576,
or 9.2%, of applications granted); Henry S. Brown and Maegan M. Hough, “Annual Report on Applications for Leave to Appeal to the Supreme
Court of Canada: The 2006‐07 Term”, (2007) 38 S.C.L.R. (2d) 557 (68 of 544 applications, or 12.5%, of applications granted); Henry S. Brown and
Adam J. Patenaude, “Annual Report on Applications for Leave to Appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada: The 2005‐06 Term”, (2006) 35 S.C.L.R.
(2d) 311 (44 of 494, or 8.9%, of applications granted); Henry S. Brown, Brian A. Crane and M. Warren Mucci, “Annual Report on Applications for
Leave to Appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada: The 2004‐05 Term”, (2005) 30 S.C.L.R. (2d) 423 (91 of 595, or 15.3%, of applications granted).
23

The five most recent articles are cited in note 24, supra.
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As Chart 2 depicts, the grant rate in Charter leave applications as a whole has declined at a
relatively steady pace over the past twenty years, from a high of 23.8% from 1989‐1994, to a
low of 15% from 2004‐09. If one compiles the total leave numbers by decade, from 1989 to
1999 the Court granted leave in 145 of 632, or 22.9%, of Charter cases; from 1999 to 2009, the
Court granted leave in 131 of 742, or 17.7%, of Charter cases.
The decline in the grant rate in Charter cases over time is understandable in light of the
increasing pressures on the Court’s docket and the declining need to provide guidance on
Charter interpretation. The need for the Court to establish the parameters of each section of
the Charter was more urgent in the early years of Charter adjudication. As Charter
jurisprudence has matured over the course of the past quarter century ‐ as the judiciary has
added jurisprudential flesh to the Charter’s textual bones ‐ one would expect the Court’s grant
rate in Charter leave applications to decline accordingly.
What is true of the Charter as a whole is also true of s.15 equality rights. In the 1990s, by
granting leave to a high percentage of s.15 cases, the Court responded to the pressing need to
provide guidance on a new and challenging area of the Charter. Developing the contours of a
substantive equality approach to the interpretation of s.15 was a shiny new judicial enterprise
in the 1990s. Section 15 came into force in 1985, three years after the rest of the Charter. The
Court’s first s.15 ruling, in 1989 in Andrews,24 put in place many of the basic principles of
interpretation. The details needed to be filled in to provide further guidance to lower courts,
governments and potential litigants. In short, the high s.15 grant rate in the 1990s was in large
part attributable to the need for the Court to develop nascent equality rights doctrine in its first
decade interpreting s.15. Moreover, as divergent approaches to the interpretation of s.15
prevailed among members of the Court through the 1990s,25 the high grant rate may have been
driven additionally by the Court’s attempts to bring stability and coherence to its s.15
jurisprudence.
The Court finally united around a common approach to the interpretation of s.15 in 1999 in Law
v. Canada.26 Justice Iacobucci, writing for a unanimous Court in Law, set out a detailed test for
the adjudication of s.15 claims.27 The Law ruling put the need to prove a violation of human
dignity at the heart of the s.15 test, guided by four “contextual factors”. While Justice Iacobucci
acknowledged that a need for “further elaborations and modifications” might emerge as the
jurisprudence evolves,28 the sharp decline in the grant rate in s.15 leave applications after 1999
24

Supra note 15.

25

These differences came to the fore in a trilogy of decisions released in 1995: Egan v. Canada, [1995] 2 S.C.R. 513; Miron v. Trudel, [1995] 2
S.C.R. 418 and Thibaudeau v. Canada, [1995] 2 S.C.R. 627.

26

[1999] 1 S.C.R. 497.

27

Id. at para. 88.

28

Id.
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likely reflects, at least in part, the Court’s view that it had put in place a comprehensive
approach that provided adequate guidance to lower courts.
We do not doubt that the decline in the grant rate in Charter cases generally, and in s.15 cases
specifically, can be explained at least in part by the growth in Charter jurisprudence over time.
Can the sharp decline in the grant rate in s.15 cases be explained entirely by this maturation of
the jurisprudence? In our view, it cannot, for two reasons. First, as we will describe below, the
s.15 jurisprudence remains unsettled in important and troubling ways. Second, while the
“maturing jurisprudence” hypothesis should apply equally to s.15 and other provisions of the
Charter (with the exception that the s.15 jurisprudence started to develop three years later
than the rest of the Charter), the decline in the grant rate in s.15 cases has been more dramatic
than the decline in the grant rate in Charter cases as a whole.

IV. THE UNSETTLED STATE OF SECTION 15 JURISPRUDENCE
As it turned out, the Law test did not achieve the stable and satisfying approach to the
adjudication of s.15 claims the Court sought. The decade following Law was a period of
continuing turbulence in the s.15 jurisprudence. The human dignity test introduced in Law
proved to be unpredictable and overly burdensome on claimants. Furthermore, in a series of
rulings, particularly in Auton29 and Hodge,30 both decided in 2004, the Court took a remarkably
narrow and technical approach to the question of the “appropriate comparator group”, one
that had dire consequences for many s.15 claims. While commentators were quick to point out
these problems with the Law test and its sequelae, it was not until 2008, in R. v. Kapp,31 that
the Court recognized the need to address them. Chief Justice McLachlin and Justice Abella,
writing the joint opinion for the Court,32 acknowledged that
…as critics have pointed out, human dignity is an abstract and subjective notion
that, even with the guidance of the four contextual factors, cannot only become
confusing and difficult to apply; it has also proven to be an additional burden on
equality claimants, rather than the philosophical enhancement it was intended
to be. Criticism has also accrued for the way Law has allowed the formalism of
some of the Court's post‐Andrews jurisprudence to resurface in the form of an
artificial comparator analysis focussed on treating likes alike.33
Two footnotes included in this passage cited nineteen scholarly sources ‐ an unusually large
number ‐ signaling the Court’s awareness of the depth and breadth of concern about the
ongoing problems in its s.15 jurisprudence. The Court’s diagnosis quoted above is clear: the s.15
29

Auton v. British Columbia, [2004] 3 S.C.R. 657;

30

Hodge v. Canada (Minister of Human Resources Development), [2004] 3 S.C.R. 657.

31

R. v. Kapp, [2008] 2 S.C.R. 483.

32

Bastarache J. wrote a separate concurrence based on s.25 of the Charter. He noted that he was “in complete agreement with the
restatement of the test for the application of s.15 that is adopted by the Chief Justice and Abella J. in their reasons for judgment.” Id. at para.
77.

33

Id. at para. 22 (emphasis in original; footnotes omitted).
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test it created has turned out to be confusing, unpredictable, overly burdensome and
excessively formalistic. Yet, the Court in Kapp did not offer a convincing prescription to cure
these ills. It took three modest steps to reformulate its approach to s.15(1). First, it simplified
the statement of the test for establishing a violation of s.15(1), producing a stripped‐down
version, strikingly minimalist in comparison to the prolix statement in Law.34 The test for
determining whether s.15(1) has been violated is now as follows:
(1) Does the law create a distinction based on an enumerated or analogous
ground?
(2) Does the distinction create a disadvantage by perpetuating prejudice or
stereotyping?35
Second, while the Court did not explicitly say so in Kapp, it now seems clear, following the 2009
rulings in Ermineskin,36 A.C.37 and Hutterian Brethren,38 that s.15 claimants no longer need to
prove a violation of human dignity.39 Third, the Court in Kapp suggested that the four
contextual factors set out in Law would continue to play a role in the s.15(1) analysis, albeit in a
reformulated manner that remains to be worked out.40 Note that the Court has not yet given
any indication of how it will reformulate its approach to comparator groups, despite its
acknowledgement of the artificiality and formalism of this part of the s.15(1) test.41
Moreover, the Court reformulated its approach to s.15(2), the ameliorative program clause, in
Kapp. The Court held, for the first time, that s.15(2) plays an “independent role”42 in protecting
governmental ameliorative programs from being challenged pursuant to s.15(1) so long as the
34

Supra note 28.

35

Kapp, supra note 33, at para. 17.

36

Supra note 4.

37

Supra note 4.

38

Supra note 4.

39

The s.15(1) test as stated in Kapp, supra note 33, was reproduced in Ermineskin, supra note 4 at paras. 188 and 201 per Rothstein J.; A.C.,
supra note 4 at para. 109 per Abella J., and at para. 150 per McLachlin C.J.; and Hutterian Brethren, supra note 4 at para. 106 per McLachlin C.J..
Human dignity is conspicuously absent from the s.15(1) discussion in these cases. Instead of asking whether the claimant’s human dignity has
been violated, the key question now is whether “a distinction based on an enumerated or analogous ground creates a disadvantage by
perpetuating prejudice or stereotyping” (A.C., supra, at para. 150). Note that an explicit consideration of the four contextual factors set out in
Law was also absent from these three 2009 rulings.
40

Kapp, supra note 33, at para. 23: “The analysis in a particular case, as Law itself recognizes, more usefully focusses on the factors that identify
impact amounting to discrimination. The four factors cited in Law are based on and relate to the identification in Andrews of perpetuation of
disadvantage and stereotyping as the primary indicators of discrimination. Pre‐existing disadvantage and the nature of the interest affected
(factors one and four in Law) go to perpetuation of disadvantage and prejudice, while the second factor deals with stereotyping. The
ameliorative purpose or effect of a law or program (the third factor in Law) goes to whether the purpose is remedial within the meaning of s.
15(2). (We would suggest, without deciding here, that the third Law factor might also be relevant to the question under s. 15(1) as to whether
the effect of the law or program is to perpetuate disadvantage.)”

41

The intervener LEAF has urged the Court to address the comparator group issue in its pending ruling in Withler v. Canada (Attorney General),
2008 BCCA 539 (appeal heard and reserved 17 March 2010).

42

Kapp, supra note 33 at para. 38.
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program has an ameliorative purpose and it targets a disadvantaged group identified by
prohibited grounds of discrimination.43 After setting out this test, the Chief Justice and Justice
Abella immediately cautioned that
In proposing this test, we are mindful that future cases may demand some
adjustment to the framework in order to meet the litigants’ particular
circumstances. However, at this early stage in the development of the law
surrounding s. 15(2), the test we have described provides a basic starting point
— one that is adequate for determining the issues before us on this appeal, but
leaves open the possibility for future refinement.44
In sum, the s.15(1) jurisprudence remains confusing, unpredictable, overly burdensome and
excessively formalistic, while the s.15(2) jurisprudence remains in its infancy. Given the
persistence of significant ongoing challenges in fully developing satisfying approaches to both
s.15(1) and s.15(2), we doubt that the sharp decline in the grant rate in s.15 leave applications
in the past decade can be explained entirely by a “maturing jurisprudence” hypothesis. This
conclusion is fortified by taking note of the sharper decline in the grant rate for s.15 cases
compared to the decline in the grant rate in Charter cases generally, a point to which we will
now return.

V. THE SHARPER RATE OF DECLINE IN THE GRANT RATE FOR SECTION 15 CASES
Our five‐year aggregations of Brown et al’s annual data (depicted in Chart 2 above) show that
the grant rate in Charter cases has declined over the past 20 years from a high of 23.8% to a low
of 15%, while our data on the grant rate in s.15 cases over the same five‐year periods (depicted
in Chart 1 above) shows a decline from a high of 47.1% to a low of 22%.45 If we aggregate and
compare the data for the two decades under study (1989‐1999 and 1999‐2009), the grant rate
in all Charter cases dropped from 22.9% to 17.7%, whereas the grant rate in s.15 cases dropped
from 42.5% to 23.2%. It appears that the grant rate in s.15 cases has been consistently higher
than the grant rate in Charter cases generally,46 although the gap has closed substantially in
recent years as the grant rate in s.15 cases has declined more sharply.

43

Id. at para. 41.

44

Id.

45

Note that the grant rate in Charter cases over this period has been consistently higher than the grant rate in leave applications generally (on
the latter, see text accompanying notes 21‐24, supra). This is hardly surprising, as Charter cases are more likely to raise issues the Court
considers of “public importance”.

46

The higher grant rate in s.15 cases compared to the grant rate in Charter cases as a whole would be consistent with the Court’s view that
equality rights “reflect the fondest dreams, the highest hopes and finest aspirations of Canadian society” (Vriend, supra note 8) and also “the
most difficult right” (Beverley McLachlin, “Equality: The Most Difficult Right”, (2001) 14 S.C.L.R. (2d) 17). Nevertheless, we caution against
drawing this conclusion without further investigation. The reason for our caution is that a comparison of the grant rate for our dataset with
Brown et al’s grant rate may be misleading. As we described above (text accompanying notes 14‐19, supra), we used narrow criteria of
inclusion in an effort to limit our dataset to “genuine” s.15 appeals (for example, we excluded cases raising s.15 issues on leave applications if
they had not been addressed by the courts below). Brown et al, in their annual reports (supra note 24), do not describe the criteria they used to
label a case a Charter case. For example, if they used more inclusive criteria, that could account for the lower grant rate they found in all
Charter cases compared to the grant rate we found in our dataset of s.15 cases.
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The proportionate decline in the grant rate over these two decades for s.15 cases was exactly
twice as high as it was for Charter cases as a whole over the same period (45.4% and 22.7%
respectively).47 In other words, while the odds of being granted leave in a Charter case dropped
by about a quarter from 1999‐2009 compared to the previous decade, the odds of being
granted leave in a s.15 case dropped by almost half over the same period. This data provides
further support for the view that the decline in the s.15 grant rate cannot be explained entirely
by evolutions in the jurisprudence. The Court’s interest in developing Charter equality rights
jurisprudence has declined dramatically since the late 1990s for reasons that cannot be
explained entirely by a diminished need to fulfill its role in guiding the development of the law
in the area.

VI. THE MARGINALIZATION OF SECTION 15 IN RECENT SUPREME COURT OF
CANADA RULINGS
The Court’s declining interest in Charter equality rights in recent years becomes even clearer
when one considers how little attention the Court ended up giving to equality rights issues in
the s.15 cases to which it granted leave to appeal. In this section, we will review what the Court
had to say in the s.15 cases to which it granted leave to appeal from 2004‐09. This was the
period with the lowest leave grant rate in s.15 cases ‐ 9 of 41 ‐ in any of the five year periods
depicted in Chart 1 above. Even then, the Court’s reasons disposing of the s.15 appeals in 5 of
these 9 cases – B.C. Health Services,48 Baier,49 Ermineskin Indian Band and Nation,50 A.C.,51 and
Hutterian Brethren52 – relegated s.15 issues to the sidelines as other constitutional issues took
centre stage. In a sixth case in this group, Fraser v. Ontario,53 a ruling on appeal is pending. It is
likely that s.15 arguments will be given brief consideration when the Court releases its ruling in
Fraser, as they were in the reasons of the Ontario Court of Appeal. In a seventh case, Hislop,54
the Court had little to add on the issue of the s.15(1) violation to what had been said by the
Ontario Court of Appeal.55 The real issue in Hislop was the appropriate remedy. That leaves only
47

We calculated the proportionate decline as follows: the grant rate in s.15 cases declined 19.3% from 42.5% to 23.2%; 19.3 of 42.5 amounts to
a proportionate decline of 45.4%. The grant rate in Charter cases declined 5.2% from 22.9% to 17.7%; 5.2 of 22.9 amounts to a proportionate
decline of 22.7%.

48

Health Services and Support – Facilities Subsector Bargaining Association v. British Columbia, [2007] 2 S.C.R. 391.

49

Baier v. Alberta, [2007] 2 S.C.R. 763.

50

Ermineskin, supra note 4.

51

A.C., supra note 4.

52

Hutterian Brethren, supra note 4.

53

th

Fraser v. Ontario (Attorney General), (2008) 301 D.L.R. (4 ) 335 (Ont. C.A.), appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada heard and reserved, 17
December 2009.

54
55

Canada (Attorney General) v. Hislop, [2007] 1 S.C.R. 429.

The Court affirmed the Ontario Court of Appeal’s ruling that the challenged federal legislation discriminated on the basis of sexual orientation
by not conferring eligibility to Canada Pension Plan survivor benefits on survivors whose same‐sex partner died prior to January 1, 1998 and by
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two of the cases granted leave from 2004 to 2009 ‐ Kapp56 and Withler57 – in which the Court
engaged, or in the case of Withler, will engage, with s.15 in any depth.
The Baier case involved a challenge based on s.2(b) and s.15 of the Charter to the validity of
Alberta legislation that prohibited public school employees from running for election as school
trustees. In opinions focused on the freedom of expression issue, the Court upheld the
legislation by an 8‐1 vote. Writing on behalf of five members of the Court, Rothstein J. quickly
disposed of the s.15 claim on the basis that occupational status is not an analogous ground of
discrimination.58 In his concurring opinion for three members of the Court, LeBel J. agreed that
“the appellants have not made out their claim of a breach of equality rights in the
circumstances of this case.”59
In Ermineskin, the Court held that the challenged provisions of the Indian Act did not violate the
Crown’s fiduciary obligations to the claimant Aboriginal bands by prohibiting the investment of
the bands’ share of royalties derived from oil and gas resources located on the bands’ reserves.
The bands had also argued that the prohibition on investing the money held in trust for them
deprived them of significant potential returns, in violation of their rights under s.15 of the
Charter. Writing for a unanimous Court dismissing the bands’ appeal, Justice Rothstein had little
difficulty rejecting the s.15 claim. While the law drew a distinction between funds held for
Aboriginal and non‐Aboriginal persons, its purpose was to place greater control over decisions
in the hands of the bands. Therefore, he held, “the provisions of the Indian Act that prohibit
investment of the royalties by the Crown do not draw a distinction that perpetuates
disadvantage through prejudice or stereotyping. There is no violation of s. 15(1) of the
Charter.”60
The decision in A.C. focused on whether the s.2(a) or s.7 rights of a 15 year old Jehovah’s
Witness were violated by a Manitoba statute that authorized the administration of treatment
without consent to “mature minors” under the age of 16. The Court, in a 6‐1 opinion, dismissed
A.C.’s Charter challenge to the legislation. In the course of its reasons, the Court commented
briefly on the argument that the statute discriminated on the basis of age. Justice Abella,
writing the principal majority opinion for four members of the Court, dismissed the s.15 claim in
a few paragraphs, concluding that the legislation is based on “maturity, not age, and no
disadvantaging prejudice or stereotype based on age can be said to be engaged.”61 In her
concurring opinion, Chief Justice McLachlin likewise had little difficulty disposing of the s.15
claim. In her view, the distinction drawn by the legislation on the basis of the age “is
failing to grant retroactive relief. In his opinion for the Court, Rothstein J. briefly dismissed the government’s arguments challenging the
conclusion that the legislation violated s.15. Id. at paras. 37‐42.
56

Supra note 33.

57

Supra note 43.

58

Baier, supra note 51 at para. 65.

59

Id. at para. 77. Justice Fish’s dissent was based on a violation of s.2(b). He did not consider the alleged violation of s.15.

60

Ermineskin, supra note 4 at para. 202.

61

A.C., supra note 4 at para. 111.
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ameliorative, not invidious.”62 In his dissent, Binnie J. found that the legislation at issue violated
s.2(a) and s.7 of the Charter. In his view it was not necessary to pursue a full s.15 analysis, as
“the real gravamen of A.C.’s complaint is [not] age discrimination. Her fundamental concern is
with the forced treatment of her body in violation of her religious convictions.”63
Like A.C., the Hutterian Brethren ruling also focused on a claim based on freedom of religion,
giving only cursory treatment to the argument that the claimants’ equality rights were violated
by Alberta’s photo requirement for driver’s licenses. McLachlin C.J., writing for a 4‐3 majority
dismissed the Charter challenge to the regulation. While a s.15 violation was assumed in the
courts below, the Chief Justice found that “it is weaker than the s. 2(a) claim and can easily be
dispensed with.”64 In her view,
Assuming the respondents could show that the regulation creates a distinction
on the enumerated ground of religion, it arises not from any demeaning
stereotype but from a neutral and rationally defensible policy choice. There is no
discrimination within the meaning of Andrews v. Law Society of British Columbia,
[1989] 1 S.C.R. 143, as explained in Kapp. The Colony members’ claim is to the
unfettered practice of their religion, not to be free from religious discrimination.
The substance of the respondents’ s. 15(1) claim has already been dealt with
under s. 2(a). There is no breach of s. 15(1).65
In separate dissents, Abella J. and LeBel J. found that the challenged regulation violated s.2(a)
and could not be justified pursuant to s.1. Even though their analyses were founded on the
burdensome impact of the law on a vulnerable religious minority, neither dissent made any
mention of the s.15 claim.
The tendency to collapse equality rights concerns into an analysis focused on alleged violations
of civil liberties evident in A.C. and Hutterian Brethren is also exemplified by the Court’s earlier
ruling in B.C. Health Services.66 At issue was the constitutional validity of B.C. legislation that
interfered with the collective bargaining rights of unions representing health care workers. The
vast majority of the employees affected by the legislation were women. The unions argued that
the Act discriminated on the basis of sex (among other grounds) and also violated their
freedom of association. The Court focused its opinion on the latter argument, finding that parts
of the Act violated freedom of association protected by s.2(d) of the Charter. The violation
could not be upheld pursuant to s.1 because the government had failed to demonstrate that
the Act impaired of freedom of association as little as reasonably possible in order to achieve its

62

Id. at para. 152.

63

Id. at para. 231.

64

Hutterian Brethren, supra note 4 at para. 105.

65

Id. at para. 108.

66

Supra note 50.
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objective of improving health care delivery.67 After reaching this conclusion, McLachlin C.J. and
LeBel J., in their joint majority opinion, disposed of the s.15 argument briskly in a single
paragraph:
…we conclude that the distinctions made by the Act relate essentially to
segregating different sectors of employment, in accordance with the long‐
standing practice in labour regulation of creating legislation specific to particular
segments of the labour force, and do not amount to discrimination under s.15 of
the Charter. The differential and adverse effects of the legislation on some
groups of workers relate essentially to the type of work they do, and not to the
persons they are. Nor does the evidence disclose that the Act reflects the
stereotypical application of group or personal characteristics. Without
minimizing the importance of the distinctions made by the Act to the lives and
work of affected health care employees, the differential treatment based on
personal characteristics required to get a discrimination analysis off the ground
is absent here.68
Like the Court’s ruling in Hutterian Brethren, this passage seems to ignore the concept of
adverse effects discrimination, supposedly a centerpiece of the Court’s commitment to a
substantive conception of equality.69 Adverse effects discrimination occurs when neutral rules
have a disproportionate impact on the basis of prohibited grounds of discrimination. There is
no need to prove a discriminatory intention; the focus is on effects. In B.C. Health Services, even
though the Act had “painful”,70 dramatic and unusual effects71 on the rights of health care
workers, a group composed predominantly of women, the Court found the Act was not
discriminatory. Without further explanation from the Court regarding the difference between
B.C. Health Services and successful adverse effects discrimination claims, it is difficult to
understand why the disproportionate impact of the B.C. legislation on women was insufficient
to get an adverse effects discrimination analysis “off the ground”.72

67

Id. at para. 156.

68

Id. at para. 165. In her reasons dissenting on the s.2(d) issue, Deschamps J. agreed with the majority that “no claim of discrimination contrary
to s.15 of the Charter has been established.” Id. at para. 170.
69

In Andrews, supra note 15 at para. 37, in defining discrimination for the purposes of s.15, the Court adopted the definition of adverse effects
discrimination put forward in O’Malley v. Simpsons‐Sears Ltd., [1985] 2 S.C.R. 536 at 551. The Court has reaffirmed the view that s.15(1)
prohibits adverse effects discrimination on a number of occasions. For examples of decisions where the Court found that equality rights were
violated by the adverse effects, or disproportionate impact, of neutral rules, see Vriend, supra note 8 at para. 82 (failure to prohibit
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation has disproportionate impact on gays and lesbians); Eldridge v. British Columbia (Attorney
General), [1997] 3 S.C.R. 624 (failure to provide public funding for interpretation in hospitals has disproportionate impact on the hearing
impaired). The leading case in the statutory anti‐discrimination context is British Columbia (Public Service Employee Relations Commission) v.
BCGSEU (“Meiorin”), [1999] 3 S.C.R. 3 (aerobic test for firefighters has disproportionate negative impact on women).

70

Supra note 50 at para. 166.

71

Id. at para. 160.

72

For an excellent discussion, see Judy Fudge, “Conceptualizing Collective Bargaining under the Charter: The Enduring Problem of Substantive
Equality”, (2008) 42 S.C.L.R. (2d) 213, 227‐243. Fudge points out that “the impact of selecting health care workers was disproportionately to
disadvantage women workers” (at 238) and that “the Court’s analysis ignored the extent to which labour legislation reflects and reinforces
historical patterns of labour market discrimination and segregation” (at 241).

18

CLPE RESEARCH PAPER SERIES

[VOL. 06 NO. 09

In Fraser, the Ontario Court of Appeal found that the challenged Ontario statute violated the
right to collective bargain of agricultural workers contrary to s.2(d) of the Charter. The
claimants also challenged the statute as a violation of s.15. The Court of Appeal devoted the
bulk of its reasons to the s.2(d) violation. It made brief comments dismissing the s.15 claim,
citing and following the conclusions of the Supreme Court in B.C. Health Services and Baier. In
the Court’s view, “there is no basis for finding that ‘agricultural worker’ is an analogous
ground.” Differential treatment of workers in a particular “economic sector” does not implicate
“a personal characteristic of the type necessary to support a s.15 claim.”73 If it follows the
recent trend, the pending Supreme Court ruling on appeal in Fraser will focus on the s.2(d)
claim, with the s.15 claim relegated to a sidebar.
The failure of the Court to engage with adverse effects discrimination arguments was also
evident in Charkaoui v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration).74 The Court did briefly discuss
and dismiss a s.15 argument that the security certificate regime in the Immigration and Refugee
Protection Act discriminates against non‐citizens by subjecting them to lengthy periods of
detention.75 The Court did not consider worthy of comment arguments of adverse effects
discrimination against Arab and Muslim men raised by three interveners.76 These interveners
pointed to the prejudice and stereotyping faced by Arab and Muslim persons in Canada post‐
9/11. They alleged that racial profiling had contributed to the discriminatory application of the
IRPA contrary to s.15. They situated their arguments in Canada’s history of discriminatory
immigration laws and policies that discriminated against vulnerable and stigmatized immigrant
communities during times of heightened security.77 These issues had not been explored in the
courts below, as the constitutional challenges brought by Almrei, Charkaoui and Harkat to the
security certificate regime had focused on s.7 of the Charter.
One can understand the reluctance of the Court in Charkaoui to comment on the issue of
adverse effects discrimination without the benefit of a full factual record and legal argument in
the lower courts. The Court’s reluctance may also be explained by the fact that the s.15
constitutional question it framed was limited to the question of discrimination between citizens
and non‐citizens. Nevertheless, the Court could have given some much‐needed life support to
the concept of adverse effects discrimination in s.15 jurisprudence by at least pointing to the
reasons why it did not consider it to be established, or even worthy of serious consideration, in
this case. By failing to comment on the interveners’ arguments, the Court’s ruling in Charkaoui
73

Fraser, supra note 55, at para. 114.

74

Supra note 18. The Charkaoui ruling is excluded from our dataset because the lower courts did not discuss s.15 of the Charter.

75

Id. at at paras. 129‐132.
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See the facta of the Canadian Arab Federation; the Canadian Council for Refugees, African Canadian Legal Clinic, International Civil Liberties
Monitoring Group, and National Anti‐Racism Council of Canada; and the Canadian Council on American‐Islamic Relations, and Canadian Muslim
Civil Liberties Association.

77

For a full discussion of the equality arguments raised by the interveners in Charkaoui, see Karen Morimoto, “Section 15 of the Charter and the
Supreme Court of Canada’s Response in Charkaoui” (Unpublished manuscript, December 2009, on file with the authors).

2010]

MANAGING CHARTER EQUALITY RIGHTS

19

adds to the impression left by BC Health Services that the Court now views adverse effects
discrimination arguments as being outside of s.15’s purview altogether.
Our discussion above has described the short shrift given to s.15 arguments in 5 of the 9 cases
to which the Court granted leave in the 2004‐2009 period. This review demonstrates that the
Court’s diminishing engagement with s.15 is evident not only in the historically low grant rate in
leave applications during this period; it is also evidenced by the alarming brevity and
superficiality of the Court’s dismissal of s.15 arguments in the majority of the s.15 cases to
which it has granted leave.

VII. WHO IS GRANTED LEAVE TO APPEAL IN SECTION 15 CASES?
In addition to tracking changes over time in the grant rate in s.15 cases, our dataset allows us to
determine whether the chances of being granted leave to appeal in s.15 cases differ depending
on whether s.15 violation are established or not established at the Court of Appeal.
Beginning with the 1989‐1990 Term, the Court has disposed of 177 applications for leave to
appeal in s.15 cases (see Appendices A and B). In 159 of these cases, the claimant failed to
establish a violation of s.15 at the Court of Appeal. The Court granted leave to appeal in roughly
one quarter of these cases (41 of 159, or 25.8%). In a much smaller group of cases, the claimant
established a violation of s.15 at the Court of Appeal. When leave was sought, usually by the
government, from a finding that Charter equality rights had been violated, the Court granted
leave most of the time – in 13 of 18 cases (or 72.2%). In other words, the odds of being granted
leave if a s.15 violation was not established at the Court of Appeal are roughly 1 in 4; the odds
of being granted leave if a s.15 violation was established at the Court of Appeal are roughly 3 in
4. These results are depicted in Chart 3 below.
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Our finding that a substantial disparity exists in s.15 grant rates depending on whether a s.15
violation was established or not established at the Court of Appeal is unsurprising for a number
of reasons. Often s.15 claims are made without a strong legal or evidentiary foundation. Among
the 159 cases where a violation was not established at the Court of Appeal, therefore, are a
significant number of misconceived or poorly presented s.15 claims. Of course these claims fail
in the lower courts and then are denied leave to appeal. In contrast, each of the 18 cases where
a violation was established at the Court of Appeal feature, by definition, viable s.15 claims. They
are, as a result, much more likely to be granted leave. Furthermore, a finding by a Court of
Appeal that a government law or policy has discriminated contrary to s.15 of the Charter in a
manner that cannot be upheld pursuant to s.1 virtually guarantees that an issue of public
importance is at stake.
Nevertheless, the size of the disparity is striking: when a s.15 claim is established at the Court of
Appeal, the Supreme Court of Canada is almost three times as likely to grant leave to appeal
compared to when a s.15 violation is not established at the Court of Appeal. The odds of being
granted leave in s.15 cases lean heavily in favour of governments.
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While the pressures on the Court’s docket mean that it cannot grant leave to every case raising
issues of public importance, the frequency with which the Court fails to hear appeals of strongly
argued s.15 claims that were rejected at the Court of Appeal is difficult to square with the view
that equality rights “reflect the fondest dreams, the highest hopes and finest aspirations of
Canadian society”.78 Those dreams, hopes and aspirations are frequently dashed in the leave
process, particularly in recent years as the leave rate in s.15 cases has plummeted. Let us offer
a few examples.
The Court has dismissed applications for leave to appeal in a series of cases, most recently in
Boulter v. Nova Scotia,79 raising the issue of whether poverty or receipt of social assistance is an
analogous ground of discrimination.80 As a result, a quarter century after s.15 came into force,
litigants still have no authoritative ruling from the top court on whether the poor can benefit
from Charter equality rights.
In addition to the issue of discrimination on the basis of poverty, the Boulter case involved a
claim that Nova Scotia legislation precluding the adjustment of power rates for low income
consumers amounted to adverse effects discrimination on the basis of race, sex, disability and
marital status, among other grounds. Five low income claimants provided evidence, supported
by nine experts and a public interest intervener. The claimants “impressive presentation”, as
Fichaud J.A. described it as the Nova Scotia Court of Appeal,81 included demographic evidence
of the over‐representation among the poor of disabled persons, women, single mothers, racial
minorities, recent immigrants, children and the elderly.82 When a claim is this well‐assembled
and raises profound constitutional issues that the Court has yet to address (whether poverty is
an analogous ground, whether the disparate impact of such a law amounts to adverse effects
discrimination), issues that have long been the subject of academic debate83 and conflicting
lower court rulings,84 the denial of leave to appeal is disconcerting to say the least.
As we described above, the Court’s ruling in Kapp reformulated the tests for s.15(1) and s.15(2).
At the same time, the Court signaled the need for further adjustments to the s.15(1) test to
78

Vriend, supra note 8.
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Boulter v. Nova Scotia Power Incorporated, 2009 NSCA 17. See also Masse v. Ontario (Ministry of Community and Social Services), (1996) 134
th
D.L.R. (4 ) 20 (Ont. Ct. Gen. Div.), leave to appeal to Ontario Court of Appeal refused, [1996] O.J. No. 1526; R. v. Banks, (2007) 275 D.L.R. (4th)
640 (Ont. C.A.).
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Had the appeal not been abandoned after leave was granted, the Court would have had an opportunity to address the issue of discrimination
th
on the basis of receipt of social assistance in Falkiner v. Ontario, (2002) 212 D.L.R. (4 ) 633 (Ont. C.A.).
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Boulter, supra note 80, at para. 84.
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Id. at para. 48.

83

Martha Jackman, “The Protection of Welfare Rights Under the Charter”, (1988) 20 Ottawa L. Rev. 257; Martha Jackman, “Poor Rights: Using
the Charter to Support Social Welfare Claims” (1993) 19 Queens L.J. 65; Martha Jackman, “Constitutional Contact with the Disparities in the
World: Poverty as a Prohibited Ground of Discrimination Under the Canadian Charter and Human Rights Law”, (1994) 2 Rev. Const. Studies 76;
Margot Young ed., Poverty: Rights, Social Citizenship and Legal Activism (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2007).
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Examples of cases supporting the view that receipt of social assistance or poverty is an analogous ground include: Falkiner, supra note 82;
th
Schaff v. Canada, [1993] 2 C.T.C. 2695; R. v. Rehberg, (1993) 111 D.L.R. (4 ) 336 (N.S.S.C.); Dartmouth Halifax (County) Regional Housing v.
th
Sparks, (1993), 101 D.L.R. (4 ) 224 (N.S.S.C.). Examples of cases supporting the view that receipt of social assistance or poverty is not an
analogous ground include: Boulter, supra note 81; Masse, supra note 81; Banks, supra note 81; Federated Anti‐Poverty Groups of B.C. v.
th
Vancouver, 2002 BCSC 105; Polewsky v. Home Hardware Stores Ltd., (2003) 229 D.L.R. (4 ) 308 (Ont. S.C.J.); Ross v. Charlottetown, 2008
PESCAD 6; Toussaint v. Canada, 2009 FC 873.
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relieve claimants of its overly burdensome and formalistic aspects. Likewise, it invited future
refinements to the new s.15(2) test it offered as a “basic starting point”. Despite the Court’s
recognition of the need for further guidance and development of the s.15 jurisprudence, it has
granted leave to appeal in only 3 of 20 s.15 leave applications since the release of Kapp.85 A
number of the cases denied leave would have offered excellent opportunities to provide
further clarification and development of the shift in direction signaled by Kapp.
For example, in Downey,86 the first s.15 ruling issued by an appellate court following Kapp, the
Nova Scotia Court of Appeal upheld Nova Scotia workers’ compensation regulations capping
benefits for chronic pain at a low level. The Downey case was a sequel to the Supreme Court’s
ruling in Martin,87 in which the Court held, reversing an opinion written by Cromwell J.A. at the
Court of Appeal,88 that the complete denial of benefits for chronic pain under Nova Scotia’s
workers’ compensation scheme constituted discrimination on the basis of physical disability
contrary to s.15. The Nova Scotia government responded by providing benefits for chronic pain
ranging from 3% to a maximum of 6% (of 75% of pre‐accident gross weekly earnings).
In Downey, Justice Cromwell wrote the opinion for the unanimous Court of Appeal, upholding
the 6% cap for reasons similar to those he gave in Martin for upholding the denial of any
benefits to injured workers for chronic pain. Cromwell J.A.’s reasons in Downey applied the Law
test as if it was “business as usual” after Kapp. After considering the appropriate comparator
group, and the four contextual factors, he concluded that the 6% cap on benefits did not
demean the dignity of workers suffering from chronic pain.89 He gave no apparent weight to
the Supreme Court’s dicta in Kapp that human dignity should not be treated as a legal test, nor
to the Court’s suggestion that s.15(1) claimants need to be relieved of the excessive burdens
and formalism that has characterized s.15(1) jurisprudence. Despite the fact that granting leave
in Downey would have given the Court an opportunity to clarify these issues, the Supreme
Court denied leave to appeal.
In Harris,90 another post‐Kapp s.15 case denied leave by the Supreme Court, the Federal Court
of Appeal divided over whether the challenged provisions of the Canada Pension Plan
discriminated on the basis of disability. To qualify for a disability pension, workers must have
made mandatory contributions to the Plan in four of the last six years prior to the date of their
application. In order to help parents meet these requirements, a “child‐rearing drop out”
85

See Appendix B. The three s.15 cases granted leave since the release of the ruling in Kapp are Fraser, supra note 55; Withler, supra note 43;
and Cunningham v. Alberta (Aboriginal Affairs and Northern Development), 2009 ABCA 53.
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Downey v. Nova Scotia (Workers' Compensation Appeals Tribunal), 2008 NSCA 65.
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Nova Scotia (Workers' Compensation Board) v. Martin; Nova Scotia (Workers' Compensation Board) v. Laseur, [2003] 2 S.C.R. 504.
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Martin v. Workers’ Compensation Board (Nova Scotia), (2000) 19 D.L.R. (4 ) 611 (N.S.C.A.).
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Downey, supra note 88 at para. 82.
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Harris v. Canada (Minister of Human Resources and Skills Development), 2009 FCA 22, [2009] 4 F.C.R. 330.
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(CRDO) provision allows the years that a contributor stayed home to care for his or her children
before they reach the age of seven to be dropped out of the contribution history. The
assumption of the provision is that parents have a greater ability to return to the workforce
once their children are in full‐time school. The claimant had to stay home to care for her
disabled child beyond the age of seven and was unable to meet the requirements for a
disability pension as a result.
The majority of the Court of Appeal found that the CRDO provision did not violate s.15. One
member of the majority, Ryer J.A., found that the claimant was not denied a benefit provided
by the law.91 The other member of the majority, Evans J.A., found that the law was aimed at the
legitimate purpose of extending benefits to “parents who temporarily leave employment to
look after young children”;92 it did not amount to differential treatment on the basis of
disability.93 In his dissent, Linden J.A. was alone in recognizing that the Supreme Court’s ruling
in Kapp “calls for a recommitment to the ideal of substantive equality”.94 In his view, the law
was based on the stereotypical view “that children seven years of age and older are capable of
attending school full‐time”, a view that does not reflect the “the different circumstances of
disabled children who are not able to attend school full‐time and continue to require ongoing
full‐time home care.”95
Granting leave to appeal in Harris would have given the Supreme Court an opportunity to
address the three different approaches to the s.15 issue articulated at the Court of Appeal. In
particular, the Court could have explored the issue of whether the law imposed disadvantage
through the operation of stereotype, the nub of the disagreement between Evans and Linden
JJ.A., and a question at the heart of the s.15(1) test as reformulated in Kapp. In addition, the
Court could have addressed whether the CRDO provision constitutes a program with an
ameliorative purpose targeted at a disadvantaged group defined by prohibited grounds of
discrimination, in accordance with the Court’s approach to s.15(2) set out in Kapp. The Court’s
decision to deny leave in Harris unfortunately deprives us of answers to these questions.
In sum, even though it has acknowledged that the s.15(1) jurisprudence remains confusing,
unpredictable, overly burdensome and excessively formalistic, and that the s.15(2)
jurisprudence remains in its infancy, and even though it has been presented with a number of
compelling s.15 leave applications, the Supreme Court persists in its recent tendency to deny
leave in s.15 cases at historically high rates, particularly if a s.15 violation has not been
established at the Court of Appeal.
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Id. at para. 106.

92

Id. at para. 81.
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Id. at para. 92.
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Id. at para. 27.
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Id. at para. 57.
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VIII. RESULTS OF APPEALS TO THE SUPREME COURT OF CANADA IN SECTION 15
CASES
When the Supreme Court of Canada does grant leave in s.15 cases, what does our dataset tell
us about the results on appeal? Is the likelihood of the Court allowing the appeal different
depending on whether the s.15 claim was established at the Court of Appeal?
We found that when a s.15 claim was established at the Court of Appeal, the Supreme Court
has allowed the appeal and dismissed the s.15 challenge in 6 of 11 cases, or 54.5% of appeals.
When the s.15 was not established at the Court of Appeal, the Court has allowed the appeal
and found an unjustifiable violation of s.15 in 6 of 38 cases, or 15.8% of appeals. In other words,
when the Supreme Court hears an appeal by a party, usually the government, from a Court of
Appeal ruling that upheld a s.15 claim, the appellant has a better than even chance of prevailing
at the Supreme Court on the s.15 issue. In contrast, when a claimant appeals from a Court of
Appeal ruling dismissing a s.15 claim, the appellant has a less than 1 in 6 chance of prevailing at
the Supreme Court on the s.15 issue. These results are depicted in Chart 4 below.
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Our data reveals that just as governments have much better odds of being granted leave by the
Supreme Court of Canada in s.15 cases (Chart 3), the odds of succeeding on appeal in s.15 cases
likewise lean heavily in favour of governments (Chart 4).

IX. CONCLUSION
While equality rights have received little attention in the Court’s recent case law (with the
exception of Kapp), equality concerns have not been absent. For example, in BC Health Services,
the Court placed emphasis on the Charter value of equality to support its recognition of a right
to collective bargain as an element of freedom of association protected by s.2(d) of the
Charter.96 As the Chief Justice and Justice LeBel wrote, “[o]ne of the fundamental achievements
of collective bargaining is to palliate the historical inequality between employers and
employees”.97 Yet, as we described above, the Court tersely dismissed the claim based on
equality rights in a manner that, as Judy Fudge has pointed out, “both reflects and promotes an
idea of equality directed at fighting stereotypes to the exclusion of fostering substantive
equality.”98
While the Court regularly affirms its commitment to interpreting s.15 as embodying a
commitment to substantive equality, it usually does so for the purpose of dismissing s.15 claims
and narrowing the scope of equality rights. One lesson embodied in substantive equality is that
differential treatment based on prohibited grounds is not necessarily discriminatory. Another is
that treating people the same when they are differently situated can have discriminatory
effects on the basis of prohibited grounds. The first lesson is a staple of the jurisprudence,
leading regularly to the dismissal of s.15 claims. The second lesson is often ignored, leading
regularly to the dismissal of claims based on adverse effects discrimination. As a result, rather
than signaling the commencement of a rich contextual inquiry into historical disadvantage and
the possible impact of a challenged law in sustaining relations of social subordination, the ritual
incantation of a commitment to substantive equality has become, perversely, the death knell of
Charter equality rights claims.
As we discussed above, the Court’s ruling last year in Hutterian Brethren,99 dismissing a Charter
challenge to the addition of a photo requirement to Alberta driver’s licence regulations, is
typical of the Court’s tendency to focus on other Charter rights and freedoms and their
reasonable limits to the exclusion of any serious consideration of equality rights. The majority
opinion of Chief Justice McLachlin dismissed the claim based on s.15 on the grounds that any
negative impact of the law on the Hutterian Brethren “arises not from any demeaning
stereotype but from a neutral and rationally defensible policy choice.”100 The dissenters, like
96

Supra note 50 at paras. 81, 84 and 86.
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Id. at para. 84.
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Fudge, supra note 74, at 216.

99

Supra note 4.
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Id. at para. 108.
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the majority, focused exclusively on the unjustifiable violation of freedom of religion. Justice
Abella’s dissent emphasized the risks the photo requirement posed to the autonomy and self‐
sufficiency of the religious community.101 She pointed out that the majority’s opinion was
inconsistent with the principle that once the state has provided a benefit (such as licensing
operators of motor vehicles), it must do so in a non‐discriminatory manner.102 In his dissent,
LeBel J. noted that a driver’s licence “is often of critical importance in daily life and is certainly
so in rural Alberta.”103 “A small group of people”, he remarked, “is being made to carry a heavy
burden.”104
As Nathalie Des Rosiers points out in this volume, religious discrimination, including
discrimination against the Hutterites, is “a well known fact of our history.”105 In Hutterian
Brethren, the Court was confronted with a law that has a disproportionately burdensome
impact on a vulnerable religious minority whose way of life has been targeted by the provincial
government in the past. Is this not a scenario that ought to be addressed by the prohibition on
religious discrimination in s.15 of the Charter? How has the jurisprudence come to a point
where s.15 has been essentially taken out of the discussion even though a government policy
has subordinating effects based on a prohibited ground of discrimination?
It is true, as Des Rosiers writes, that freedom of religion can do much of the work necessary to
prevent state subordination of religious groups: “in Canada, freedom of religion has always had
strong anti‐discrimination and equality undertones.”106 Peter Hogg has noted that the Court has
tended to interpret equality rights restrictively, while giving substantial weight to equality
values in the interpretation of the scope and limits of other Charter rights and freedoms.107 This
phenomenon continues with recent rulings such as BC Health Services and Hutterian Brethren –
101

Id. at paras. 114, 164‐170.

102

Id. at para. 171, citing Eldridge, supra note 71.
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Hutterian Brethren, id., at para. 201.
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Nathalie Des Rosiers, “Freedom of Religion at the Supreme Court in 2009: Multiculturalism at the Crossroads?” at manuscript p.4. See
William Janzen, Limits on Liberty: The Experience of Mennonite, Hutterite and Doukhobor Communities in Canada, (Toronto: University of
Toronto Press, 1990). The Hutterian Brethren ruling is not the first time that the Court has been insensitive to the potential for majoritarian
hostility to the Hutterites’ religious beliefs and practices. The Hutterites live in rural colonies where the land is held in common in accordance
with their religious beliefs. In Walter v. Alberta (Attorney General), [1969] S.C.R. 383, the Court managed to ignore the history of anti‐Hutterite
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purpose, related to “property and civil rights”, to ground the Act in provincial jurisdiction. For background on the Act, see Douglas E. Sanders,
“The Hutterites: A Case Study in Minority Rights”, (1964) 42 Can. Bar Rev. 225. The Act was repealed in 1972, a few years after the Walter
ruling.
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equality concerns are displaced to, and subsumed within, a discussion of civil liberties. Hogg
speculated that there might be a connection, however elusive and difficult to understand,
between the Court’s warm embrace of equality values and its cool distance from equality
rights.108 He concluded with a cautious endorsement of the Court’s approach, suggesting that it
might make sense because it allows for heightened scrutiny of violations of the civil liberties of
vulnerable or disadvantaged groups, while limiting s.15 to a restricted role of remedying
“classifications that are based on listed or analogous grounds and impair human dignity.”109
We are less comfortable than Professor Hogg with the tendency of the Court to shift equality
concerns from s.15 to other Charter rights and freedoms. Of course, a basic constitutional value
like equality should assist in the interpretation of all Charter provisions. Indeed, such an
approach is mandated by Canada’s international commitments to protecting all fundamental
rights and freedoms without discrimination.110 But a provision requiring non‐discrimination in
the enjoyment of other rights and freedoms should not be confused with a free‐standing
prohibition on discrimination. Section 15 should provide, through a large and liberal
interpretation, an independent guarantee of equality rights that overlaps with and extends
beyond protection provided by other Charter rights and freedoms.
In a case like Hutterian Brethren, by essentially ignoring religious equality rights, and focusing
on religious freedom alone, we blinker our legal vision. The Charter protects from state
interference with the practice of religion (s.2(a)) and from state discrimination on the basis of
religion (s.15). The two provisions are closely related, but one does not exhaust the other. A
meaningful, independent role ought to be accorded to each. What is lost when equality rights
are submerged? Do equality rights not provide a way of viewing social and legal context that
adds to the lens provided by civil liberties?
Equality rights jurisprudence recognizes a restricted number of personal characteristics as
prohibited grounds of discrimination. The recognized grounds are ones that have been
deployed persistently and pervasively as tools of power. As Reva Siegel has written,
…antidiscrimination law regulates the social practices that sustain group
inequality. The group inequalities that concern antidiscrimination law are
typically those that are socially pervasive (articulated across social domains) and
socially persistent (articulated over time). When inequality among groups is
structurally pervasive and persistent in this way, we typically refer to it as a
condition of social stratification.111
108

Id. at 133.
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Id. at 134.
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Equality rights are meant to focus our attention on removing laws or practices whose effects
perpetuate relations of social subordination based on the personal characteristics of historically
disadvantaged groups. Are we confident that dynamics of this kind were absent from the
Alberta government’s treatment of the Wilson Colony or from the B.C. government’s treatment
of predominantly female health care workers?112 How can we be confident of the answers to
these questions when they were passed over so superficially in the Court’s rulings in Hutterian
Brethren and BC Health Services?
Returning to the Chief Justice’s brief reasons dismissing the s.15 claim in Hutterian Brethren,113
can we say that when laws pursue “rationally defensible policy choices” they should be
immunized from scrutiny for discriminatory effects violating s.15? Can we say a law is “neutral”
if it has adverse effects on the basis of a prohibited ground of discrimination? The jurisprudence
on disability discrimination emphatically provides negative answers to these questions. For
example, in Eaton v. Brant County Board of Education,114 Justice Sopinka in his majority opinion
eloquently described the “‘mainstream’ attributes” that can “act as headwinds to the
enjoyment of society’s benefits” for the disabled.115 In his words:
…it is the failure to make reasonable accommodation, to fine‐tune society so
that its structures and assumptions do not result in the relegation and
banishment of disabled persons from participation, which results in
discrimination against them. The discrimination inquiry which uses the
‘attribution of stereotypical characteristics’ reasoning as commonly understood
is simply inappropriate here. It may be seen rather as a case of reverse
stereotyping which, by not allowing for the condition of a disabled individual,
ignored his or her disability and forces the individual to sink or swim within the
mainstream environment. It is recognition of the actual characteristics, and the
reasonable accommodation of these characteristics which is the central purpose
of s.15(1) in relation to disability.116
The type of “reverse stereotyping” to which Sopinka J. refers – the failure to consider the
distinct needs and circumstances of politically vulnerable and socially subordinated groups – is
particularly relevant to people with disabilities. But it is not a phenomenon restricted to the
dynamics of disability discrimination. “Reverse stereotyping” may undergird incidences of
discrimination involving any of the enumerated and analogous grounds of discrimination
recognized by s.15. The grounds are recognized precisely because they have been persistently
112
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and pervasively deployed by the law – or ignored by the law – in ways that promote relations of
social subordination.117 A full Charter analysis must interrogate, from an equality rights
perspective, the possibility that such dynamics continue to operate.
As the analysis we have presented makes clear, to say that Charter equality rights are not in
judicial vogue is an understatement. Will the Supreme Court of Canada continue to preside
over the twilight of Charter equality rights or will it invigorate the dreams, hopes and
aspirations they embody? The mystery and silence that surrounds the leave to appeal process
make this question difficult to answer. We are left to speculate on the reasons for the sharp
decline in the Court’s interest in Charter equality rights. Perhaps the Court is of the view that
the dreams, hopes and aspirations expressed by s.15 have been accomplished. Perhaps the
Court’s recent record on equality rights is a reflection of broader political and cultural shifts
which are unsupportive of a continuing strong role for anti‐discrimination law, exemplified by
the cancellation of the Court Challenges Program and of other funding for equality‐seeking
groups. Perhaps the main sources of systemic inequalities lie beyond the Charter’s reach.118
Perhaps the Court’s commitment to substantive equality will always be circumscribed by liberal
legalism119 and an unwillingness to utilize s.15 to redistribute material resources.120 Whatever
the explanations are for the increasing circumscription of Charter equality rights, wise potential
claimants know that they need to be cautious before placing hopes in costly and burdensome
s.15 litigation. Our analysis suggests that Charter equality rights may be reinvigorated, from a
moribund to at least a modest role, particularly if the Court is willing to recognize new
analogous grounds, to take seriously claims based on adverse effects discrimination, and to
implement other shifts in the jurisprudence that relieve claimants of the onerous burdens they
now face in proving that differential treatment on prohibited grounds amounts to
discrimination.
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APPENDIX A: ANNUAL DISPOSITION OF LEAVE TO APPEAL APPLICATIONS IN
SECTION 15 CASES
Term
1989‐1990
1990‐1991
1991‐1992
1992‐1993
1993‐1994
1994‐1995
1995‐1996
1996‐1997
1997‐1998
1998‐1999
1999‐2000
2000‐2001
2001‐2002
2002‐2003
2003‐2004
2004‐2005
2005‐2006
2006‐2007
2007‐2008
2008‐2009
2009‐
2010121
Total

121

Up to 31 July 2010.

# of Section 15
Leave Applications
8
9
10
7
5
2
5
12
11
4
12
11
9
15
7
6
7
5
13
10

#
Granted
1
3
4
4
3
1
2
8
3
2
3
2
2
6
0
2
1
2
2
2

% Granted

9
177

1
54

11.1%
30.5%

12.5%
33.3%
40.0%
57.1%
60.0%
50.0%
40.0%
66.7%
27.3%
50.0%
25.0%
18.2%
22.2%
40.0%
0.0%
33.3%
14.3%
40.0%
15.4%
20.0%
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APPENDIX B: DISPOSITION OF LEAVE TO APPEAL APPLICATIONS IN SECTION 15
CASES SINCE 1989
We characterize s.15 claims to be “established” at the Court of Appeal if the court found a
violation of s.15 that was not demonstrably justified as a reasonable limit pursuant to s.1. We
characterize s.15 claims as “not established” at the Court of Appeal if the court did not find a
violation of s.15 or if the court found a violation of s.15 that was demonstrably justified as a
reasonable limit pursuant to s.1. The final column in the chart below for “result of appeal”
refers to the result on the s.15 claim alone.
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Case Name

1989‐1990 Term (1 of 8 granted)
1. R. v. Hess; R. v. Nguyen
2. R. v. Paul Magder Furs Ltd
3. Mun. Cont. Ltd v. IUOE Loc. 721
4. NAPO v. Canada
5. Skalbania v. Wedge. Vill. Est. Ltd
6. Brochner v. MacDonald
7. Prior v. Canada
8. Richman v. Wheaton
1990‐1991 Term (3 of 9 granted)
9. Canada v. Chiarelli
10. R. c. Lortie
11. Schachter v. Canada
12. Canada v. Central Cartage Co.
13. R. v. Baig
14. R. v. Généreux
15. Alc. Found’n of Man. v. Wpg.
16. R. c. Genest
17. Wittman v. Emmott
1991‐1992 Term (4 of 10 granted)
18. R. v. Sawchuk
19. Murphy v. Welsh
20. Auger v. Alberta
21. Weatherall v. Canada
22. Janitzki v. Canada
23. Symes v. Canada
24. Fenton v. B.C.
25. Mohr v. Scoffield
26. Miron v. Trudel
27. Cdn Assn of Reg’d Imp. v. Cda
1992‐1993 Term (4 of 7 granted)
28. Jones v. Ont; Rheaume v. Ont
29. Haig v. Canada
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SCC
Case #

Est’d
at
CA?

Result of Leave
Application

Result of
Appeal

20809
21392
21498
21531
21585
21547
21609
21709
21722

No

Granted, 19 Oct. 1989

Dismissed

No
No
No
No
No
No
No

Dismissed, 9 Nov. 1989
Dismissed, 16 Nov. 1989
Dismissed, 23 Nov. 1989
Dismissed, 30 Nov. 1989
Dismissed, 7 Dec. 1989
Dismissed, 22 Feb. 1990
Dismissed, 29 Mar. 1990

‐
‐
‐
‐
‐
‐
‐

21920
21950
21889
22057
22167
22103
22005
22118
22340

No
No
Yes
No
No
No
Yes
No
No

Granted, 8 Nov. 1990
Dismissed, 8 Nov. 1990
Granted, 15 Nov. 1990
Dismissed, 17 Jan. 1991
Dismissed, 31 Jan. 1991
Granted, 7 Feb. 1991
Dismissed, 14 Mar. 1991
Dismissed, 18 Apr. 1991
Dismissed, 29 Aug. 1991

Dismissed
‐
Dismissed
‐
‐
Dismissed
‐
‐
‐

22572
22542
22557
22633
22779
22659
22612
22784
22744
22871

No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No

Dismissed, 7 Nov. 1991
Granted, 6 Feb. 1992
Dismissed, 6 Feb. 1992
Granted, 6 Feb. 1992
Dismissed, 5 Mar. 1992
Granted, 26 Mar. 1992
Dismissed, 9 Apr. 1992
Dismissed, 7 May 1992
Granted, 4 Jun. 1992
Dismissed, 26 Jun. 1992

‐
‐(1)
‐
Dismissed
‐
Dismissed
‐
‐
Allowed
‐

22935
23223

No
No

Dismissed, 24 Sep. 1992
Granted, 22 Oct. 1992

‐
Dismissed
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30. R. v. Finta
31. Penner v. Danbrook
32. NWAC v. Canada
33. Rodriguez v. British Columbia
34. Fernandes v. Manitoba
1993‐1994 Term (3 of 5 granted)
35. Nguyen v. Canada
36. Egan v. Canada
37. Benner v. Canada
38. Thibaudeau v. Canada
39. McCarten v. PEI
1994‐1995 Term (1 of 2 granted)
40. Adler v. Ontario
41. Schachtschneider v. Canada
1995‐1996 Term (2 of 5 granted)
42. Lewis v. Burnaby Schl Dist. #41
43. Eaton v. Brant Co. Bd. of Ed.
44. Grant v. Canada
45. Eldridge v. British Columbia
46. Netupsky v. Canada
1996‐1997 Term (8 of 12 granted)
47. Vriend v. Alberta
48. Huynh v. Canada
49. Law v. Canada
50. Masse v. Ontario
51. Vancouver SIVMW v. Canada
52. R. v. M.S.
53. M. v. H.
54. Corbiere v. Canada
55. Orlowski v. British Columbia
56. Bese v. British Columbia
57. Winko v. British Columbia
58. Bahlsen v. Canada
1997‐1998 Term (3 of 11 granted)
59. Delisle v. Canada
60. Gale Estate v. Hominick
61. Perry v. Ontario
62. Schafer v. Canada
63. Bal v. Ontario
64. Lovelace v. Ontario
65. R. v. LePage
66. A & L Inv. Ltd. v. Ontario
67. East York v. Ontario
68. Canada v. Wong
69. Villeneuve c. Quebec

23097
23122
23253
23476
23169

No
No
No
No
No

Granted, 10 Dec. 1992
Dismissed, 21 Jan. 1993
Granted, 11 Mar. 1993
Granted, 23 Mar. 1993
Dismissed, 15 Apr. 1993

Dismissed
‐
Dismissed
Dismissed
‐

23474
23636
23811
24154
24098

No
No
No
Yes
No

Dismissed, 14 Oct. 1993
Granted, 14 Oct. 1993
Granted, 10 Mar. 1994
Granted, 23 Jun. 1994
Dismissed, 25 Aug. 1994

‐
Dismissed
Allowed
Allowed
‐

24347
23698

No
No

Granted, 2 Feb. 1995
Dismissed, 1 Jun. 1995

Dismissed
‐

24514
24668
24890
24896
25223

No
Yes
No
No
No

Dismissed, 21 Sep. 1995
Granted, 26 Oct. 1995
Dismissed, 15 Feb. 1996
Granted, 9 May 1996
Dismissed, 15 Aug. 1996

‐
Allowed
‐
Allowed
‐

25285
25379
25374
25462
25359
25742
25838
25708
25751
25855
25856
25783

No
No
No
No
No
No
Yes
Yes
No
No
No
No

Granted, 3 Oct. 1996
Dismissed, 24 Oct. 1996
Granted, 5 Dec. 1996
Dismissed, 5 Dec. 1996
Granted, 6 Mar. 1997
Dismissed, 6 Mar. 1997
Granted, 24 Apr. 1997
Granted, 27 Apr. 1997
Granted, 8 May 1997
Granted, 8 May 1997
Granted, 8 May 1997
Dismissed, 19 Jun. 1997

Allowed
‐
Dismissed
‐
Dismissed
‐
Dismissed
Dismissed
Dismissed
Dismissed
Dismissed
‐

25926
26002
26167
26246
26116
26165
26320
26395
26385
26465
26499

No
No
No
Yes
No
No
No
No
No
No
No

Granted, 16 Oct. 1997
Dismissed, 16 Oct. 1997
Dismissed, 18 Dec. 1997
Dismissed, 29 Jan. 1998
Dismissed, 12 Feb. 1998
Granted, 12 Feb. 1998
Granted, 19 Feb. 1998
Dismissed, 19 Mar. 1998
Dismissed, 2 Apr. 1998
Dismissed, 11 Jun. 1998
Dismissed, 11 Jun. 1998

Dismissed
‐
‐
‐
‐
Dismissed
Dismissed
‐
‐
‐
‐
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1998‐1999 Term (2 of 4 granted)
70. Granovsky v. Canada
71. Gallant v. New Brunswick
72. Sutherland v. Canada
73. Little Sisters v. Canada
1999‐2000 Term (3 of 12 granted)
74. Ont. Pub. Sch. Bd. Assn. v. Ont.
75. Ferrell v. Ontario
76. Moxham v. Canada
77. Guillemette v. Canada
78. R. v. Nelson
79. Dunmore v. Ontario
80. Franks v. B.C.
81. Jazairi v. Ontario
82. Lavoie v. Canada
83. Gosselin v. Quebec
84. Pawar v. Canada
85. Cameron v. Nova Scotia
2000‐2001 Term (2 of 11 granted)
86. Cannella v. TTC
87. Pérusse v. Canada
88. Hogan v. Newfoundland
89. Nova Scotia v. Walsh
90. Archibald v. Canada
91. Moffatt v. Canada
92. Vachon c. Société d'aménag.
93. Nova Scotia v. Martin & Laseur
94. Scheuneman v. Canada
95. Weeks v. Canada
96. McLean v. Canada
2001‐2002 Term (2 of 9 granted)
97. Théroux c. Comm’n Scolaire
98. Siemens v. Manitoba
99. Irshad v. Ontario
100. Bauman v. Nova Scotia
101. Trociuk v. British Columbia
102. Westmount c. Quebec
103. Krock v. Canada
104. Ayangma v. P.E.I.
105. B.H. v. Alberta
2002‐2003 Term (6 of 15 granted)
106. CFCYL v. Canada
107. Collins v. Canada
108. Ent. W.F.H. Ltée. c. Quebec
109. Deol v. Canada
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26615
26785
26056
26858

No
No
No
Yes

Granted, 8 Oct. 1998
Dismissed, 17 Dec. 1998
Dismissed, 28 Jan. 1999
Granted, 18 Feb. 1999

Dismissed
‐
‐
Dismissed

27490
27127
27180
27280
27594
27216
27414
27500
27427
27418
27578
27584

Yes
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No

Dismissed, 4 Nov. 1999
Dismissed, 9 Dec. 1999
Dismissed, 9 Dec. 1999
Dismissed, 16 Dec. 1999
Dismissed, 17 Feb. 2000
Granted, 24 Feb. 2000
Dismissed, 2 Mar. 2000
Dismissed, 3 May 2000
Granted, 25 May 2000
Granted, 1 Jun. 2000
Dismissed, 8 Jun. 2000
Dismissed, 29 Jun. 2000

‐
‐
‐
‐
‐
Dismissed
‐
‐
Dismissed
Dismissed
‐
‐

27705
27835
27865
28179
28116
27895
28098
28370
28344
28421
28498

No
No
No
Yes
No
No
No
No
No
No
No

Dismissed, 14 Sep. 2000
Dismissed, 12 Oct. 2000
Dismissed, 9 Nov. 2000
Granted, 15 Feb. 2001
Dismissed, 15 Mar. 2001
Dismissed, 22 Mar. 2001
Dismissed, 3 May 2001
Granted, 14 Jun. 2001
Dismissed, 21 Jun. 2001
Dismissed, 30 Aug. 2001
Dismissed, 30 Aug. 2001

‐
‐
‐
Allowed
‐
‐
‐
Allowed
‐
‐
‐

28166
28416
28571
28619
28726
28869
28740
29002
29174

No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No

Dismissed, 6 Sep. 2001
Granted, 13 Sep. 2001
Dismissed, 13 Sep. 2001
Dismissed, 13 Sep. 2001
Granted, 8 Nov. 2001
Dismissed, 7 Dec. 2001
Dismissed, 21 Feb. 2002
Dismissed, 25 Jun. 2002
Dismissed, 11 Jul. 2002

‐
Dismissed
‐
‐
Allowed
‐
‐
‐
‐

29113
29189
28978
29371

No
No
No
No

Granted, 17 Oct. 2002
Dismissed, 24 Oct. 2002
Dismissed, 12 Dec. 2002
Dismissed, 20 Feb. 2003

Dismissed
‐
‐
‐

2010]
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110. Falkiner v. Ontario
111. Hodge v. Canada
112. Brebric v. Niksic
113. Webb v. Waterloo Police S.B.
114. Miller v. Canada
115. Gosselin (Tutor of) v. Quebec
116. Mack v. Canada
117. McFadyen v. Canada
118. Auton v. British Columbia
119. Newfoundland v. N.A.P.E.
120. Canada v. Lesiuk
2003‐2004 Term (0 of 7 granted)
121. Chippewas of Nawash v. Cda
122. Bear v. Canada
123. Taylor v. Canada
124. MacKay v. B.C.
125. Power v. Canada
126. Burnett v. British Columbia
127. C.S.N. c. Québec
2004‐2005 Term (2 of 6 granted)
128. Fitzgerald v. Alberta
129. R. v. Mackenzie
130. Health Services v. B.C.
131. Simser v. Canada
132. Canada v. Hislop
133. R. v. Schneider
2005‐2006 Term (1 of 7 granted)
134. BCGEU v. B.C.
135. Kempling v. B.C.C.T.
136. Manoli v. Canada
137. R. v. Hy and Zel’s Inc.
138. Arishenkoff v. B.C.
139. Baier v. Alberta
140. Métis N.C. of Women v. Cda
2006‐2007 Term (2 of 5 granted)
141. R. v. J.C.
142. Wetzel v. Canada
143. R. v. Kapp
144. R. v. Banks
145. Ermineskin Ind. Band v. Cda
2007‐2008 Term (2 of 13 granted)
146. Melanson v. New Brunswick
147. A.C. v. Manitoba
148. Alberta v. Hutterian Brethren
149. Howe v. Canada

29294
29351
29388
29397
29501
29298
29475
29591
29508
29597
29642

Yes
Yes
No
No
No
No
No
No
Yes
No
No

Granted, 20 Mar. 2003
Granted, 20 Mar. 2003
Dismissed, 20 Mar. 2003
Dismissed, 20 Mar. 2003
Dismissed, 17 Apr. 2003
Granted, 24 Apr. 2003
Dismissed, 24 Apr. 2003
Dismissed, 24 Apr. 2003
Granted, 15 May 2003
Granted, 5 Jun. 2003
Dismissed, 17 Jul. 2003

‐(2)
Allowed
‐
‐
‐
Dismissed
‐
‐
Allowed
Dismissed
‐

29568
29666
29678
29765
29886
29987
30069

No
No
No
No
No
No
No

Dismissed, 18 Sep. 2003
Dismissed, 18 Sep. 2003
Dismissed, 25 Sep. 2003
Dismissed, 25 Sep. 2003
Dismissed, 22 Jan. 2004
Dismissed, 26 Feb. 2004
Dismissed, 1 April 2004

‐
‐
‐
‐
‐
‐
‐

30453
30359
30554
30746
30755
30761

No
No
No
No
Yes
No

Dismissed, 6 Jan. 2005
Dismissed, 3 Feb. 2005
Granted, 21 April 2005
Dismissed, 23 June 2005
Granted, 23 June 2005
Dismissed, 25 Aug. 2005

‐
‐
Dismissed
‐
Dismissed
‐

30925
31088
31039
31287
31251
31526
31421

No
No
No
No
No
No
No

Dismissed, 22 Sept. 2005
Dismissed, 19 Jan. 2006
Dismissed, 9 Feb. 2006
Dismissed, 30 Mar. 2006
Dismissed, 27 April 2006
Granted, 28 July 2006
Dismissed, 17 Aug. 2006

‐
‐
‐
‐
‐
Dismissed
‐

31406
31453
31603
31929
31875

Yes
No
No
No
No

Dismissed, 14 Sept. 2006
Dismissed, 12 Oct. 2006
Granted, 14 Dec. 2006
Dismissed, 23 Aug. 2007
Granted, 30 Aug. 2007

‐
‐
Dismissed
‐
Dismissed

32008
31955
32186
32198

No
No
Yes
No

Dismissed, 20 Sept. 2007
Granted, 25 Oct. 2007
Granted, 29 Nov. 2007
Dismissed, 6 Dec. 2007

Dismissed
Allowed
‐
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150. Tomasson v. Canada
151. APPQ c. Sûreté du Québec
152. Zhang v. Canada
153. Veffer v. Canada
154. Moresby Explorers Inc. v. Cda
155. Soucy c. Québec
156. Marchand v. Ontario
157. Longley v. Canada
158. Guzman v. Canada
2008‐2009 Term (2 of 10 granted)
159. Giacomelli Estate v. Canada
160. Ross v. Charlottetown
161. Ali v. Canada
162. Sagharian v. Ontario
163. Downey v. Nova Scotia
164. Dodd v. Warden of I.M.H.
165. Fraser v. Ontario
166. Withler v. Canada
167. Mullins v. Levy
168. Harris v. Canada
2009‐2010 Term(3) (1 of 9 granted)
169. Boulter v. Nova Scotia
170. Gill v. Canada
171. McIvor v. Canada
172. Morrow v. Zhang
173. Sagen v. VANOC
174. R. v. Little
175. Cunningham v. Alberta
176. Hartling v. Nova Scotia
177. Ray v. The Queen
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32298
32301
32209
32260
32327
32406
32455
32459
32409

No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No

Dismissed, 24 Jan. 2008
Dismissed, 31 Jan. 2008
Dismissed, 7 Feb. 2008
Dismissed, 14 Feb. 2008
Dismissed, 21 Feb. 2008
Dismissed, 24 April 2008
Dismissed, 24 April 2008
Dismissed, 24 April 2008
Dismissed, 3 July 2008

‐
‐
‐
‐
‐
‐
‐
‐
‐

32690
32734
32762
32753
32822
32845
32968
33039
33070
33091

No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No

Dismissed, 25 Sept. 2008
Dismissed, 23 Oct. 2008
Dismissed, 20 Nov. 2008
Dismissed, 4 Dec. 2008
Dismissed, 11 Dec. 2008
Dismissed, 18 Dec. 2008
Granted, 2 April 2009
Granted, 28 May 2009
Dismissed, 11 June 2009
Dismissed, 09 July 2009

‐
‐
‐
‐
‐
‐
Pending
Pending
‐
‐

33124
33144
33201
33311
33439
33390
33340
33572
33610

No
No
Yes
No
No
No
Yes
No
No

Dismissed, 10 Sept. 2009
Dismissed, 29 Oct. 2009
Dismissed, 5 Nov. 2009
Dismissed, 17 Dec. 2009
Dismissed, 22 Dec. 2009
Dismissed, 14 Jan. 2010
Granted, 11 April 2010
Dismissed, 27 May 2010
Dismissed, 24 June 2010

‐
‐
‐
‐
‐
‐
Pending
‐
‐

(1) After leave was granted in Murphy v. Welsh, the claimant did not pursue the s.15 violation
issue. See [1991]
S.C.C.A. No. 283.
(2) After leave was granted in Falkiner v. Ontario, a notice of discontinuance was filed. See [2002]
S.C.C.A. No. 297.
(3) Up to 31 July 2010.

